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Abstract: The multidisciplinary nature of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee reflects the
commitment as well as the expectations and demands of diverse stakeholders. So far, CSR committees
have been mainly considered as variables of control in larger corporate governance models and
independent variables that determine CSR or environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure
and its reporting quality. However, the effect on corporate performance has been biased to financial
performance, so the potential of the analysis of the effect it may have on different facets of non-financial
performance has not been exploited. Which it should, since it can be a fundamental tool to achieve
sustainability. The objective of this contribution is to test whether companies with a CSR committee not
only leads to higher economic scores, but also to higher ESG (environmental, social, governance) scores.
To do this, we used regression panel data models in 197 listed firms in Spain, France, Germany, and the
UK during the period 2005–2015 including the perspective of European organizations and completing
the extant studies in US-based samples. Our results showed that 90% of companies in the sample had a
CSR committee in 2014, and that those companies had significantly different ESG scores than those
without a CSR committee. Having a CSR committee also triggered better non-financial performance
when considering the four scores and the four countries independently (except for the economic scores
in Spain). These results have great implications for practitioners, reflecting the importance of promoting
these tools in an organization to enhance non-financial performance and sustainability.
Keywords: ESG performance; non-financial performance; sustainability; CSR; CSR committees; ESG;
ESG scores
1. Introduction
The creation of corporate committees has the purpose of making recommendations to corporate
boards and assist board members in their functions. In this advisory role, there are three committees
that traditionally guarantee good functioning and independence of the boards, that is, the audit
committee, remuneration committee, and nominating committee. As corporate governance bodies,
they have been the subject of attention in the literature in recent years [1–4], and their importance has
grown since boards are delegating their key functions more and more to those committees. Increasingly,
an important part of those functions is related to social responsibility, sustainability, and their impacts
on society. Thus, the creation of a CSR committee is, beyond the conviction and commitment of
corporate boards on sustainability, one of the first steps that most international standards and guidelines
will advise is its implementation to perform a CSR policy. Strong performance in social issues is,
as Craig Mackenzie notes, “a source of opportunity to strengthen trust in their brands and to enhance
employee motivation” [5] (p. 935). In fact, having a multidisciplinary team that promotes, monitors,
and disseminates the socially responsible commitment of the company is a signal to the market [6–8]
and to other competitors, as it indicates “an active strategic posture with regards to stakeholder
relationships” [8] (p. 125).
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In the academic literature, the study of CSR or sustainability committees has been closely linked
to their relationship with corporate governance, especially its role in the board of directors and
its interaction with other types of variables (diversity and independence of the board of directors).
Therefore, in most cases, research has focused on CSR committees as a corporate governance variable
for larger models [1,9–13], mainly related to the disclosure of CSR or ESG information [1,14–19]. In this
regard, CSR committees have shown an influence on the volume and quality of CSR information issued
by the company, showing its ability to act and decide on sustainability reporting. CSR disclosure is
often used as a proxy for CSR implementation [4], but “does not necessarily mean that companies
provide the actual performance but the one that the company wants to present to stakeholders” [4]
(p. 570). As an entity in itself, CSR committees have been analyzed from the perspective of its
composition [7,20–23] as well as from the perspective of its establishment, considering the drivers for
the presence of CSR committee [6] in the organization. In the business context, most large companies
disclose the presence of a CSR committee in the organization and its importance in the management
of social and environmental impacts in their reports. However, the analysis of the impact that these
CSR or sustainability committees have on different facets of non-financial performance, preceding the
quantity and quality of CSR/ESG/sustainability information disclosure, is underdeveloped. A search
in the WoS database using the fields topic “CSR” OR “sustainability” AND “committees” refined by
“performance” and “CSR committees” and time span “all years” resulted in 15 records. The number of
records was 13 if the search was refined by “disclosure” instead of by “performance”.
Some researchers have raised the question of the effectiveness of new board (CSR) committees
on achieving compliance with CSR standards [5,7], but there have been fewer attempts to measure
the efficiency of turning social strategy into action. However, we must highlight the study of [3] of
100 US companies testing the existence of sustainability committees in economic, environmental, and
social sustainability performance; the study of [8] in a US-based sample of companies considered
the Best Corporate Citizens over the period 2005–2007; and the study of [7] in a sample of 1742 US
companies in the period 2003–2013. Attempts to analyze the effect of sustainability committees on ESG
performance in Europe are also limited and differ in their premises. First, the study of [22] focused
on the percentage of independent members in the sustainability committee—not the fact of having
such a committee—and the likelihood of being included in Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI)
Europe. On the other hand, [23] considered the variable CSR committee in their model of corporate
governance, but together with other characteristics such as board composition, board diversity, board
independence, board size, and board meetings. In this larger model, [23] found that the establishment
of a CSR committee positively impacted a bank’s ESG performance by using a unique ESG score in a
sample of US and European banks.
Thus, the studies proposed so far differ mainly around four main issues: dependent variable
(ESG disclosure vs. ESG performance); consideration of CSR committees as independent variables
or variables in larger models; the sample (US-based vs European companies); and the use of one or
several indicators of ESG. Continuing our previous work [24], in which it was obtained that CSR
committees act as control mechanisms, we considered that it was important to give relevance to CSR
committees as the main independent variable in achieving non-financial performance. In addition, we
followed the lines of work proposed by [7,8,22,25] and also considered different non-financial areas.
Thus, the objective of this paper was to analyze whether the presence of a CSR committee affected
environmental, social, corporate governance (ESG) and economic performance.
This paper contributes to the literature and practitioners in several ways. First, we contribute to
the current literature on corporate governance, especially other corporate governance bodies other than
the traditional board committees and their effectiveness in organizational performance. Second, CSR
committees “play an important role in assisting the management in CSR strategy formulation and in
reviewing the firm’s CSR performance” [26] (p. 575), so we wanted to test the efficiency of CSR committees,
beyond the support to the board, in increasing ESG scores in the listed companies of four of the largest
economies in Europe. This contributes to the knowledge of CSR within the US vs. Europe approach,
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as we were able to compare our results with the studies already carried out in the US. To do this, we
advocated the use of disaggregated scores to provide greater insight into the efficiency of CSR committees.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes a framework about the
role of CSR committees and its relationship with ESG performance. Section 3 describes the methods of
the study. Section 4 includes the results of the empirical research, and Section 5 includes the discussion.
2. The Role of CSR Committees and Its Effect on ESG Scores
A CSR committee is usually understood as a subcommittee of the board of directors and can have
different names such as “ethics, sustainable development, environment, health and safety, or a public
responsibility committee” [20] (p. 1926). Regarding [20], the main characteristics of CSR include the
“committee members’ experience and knowledge in this field, the responsibility of proposing to the
board the CSR policies and strategies to be followed, guaranteeing the proper functioning of CSR
information and control systems, and supervision of the annual report” [14] (p. 16). The creation of a
CSR committee responds to statements of stakeholder theory, as it implies the creation of governance
bodies [9,27] that are able to fulfill stakeholder needs. In addition, the presence of a CSR committee
serves as the connection between stakeholder theory and agency theory, as “CSR engagement is a
principal–agent relation between managers and shareholders” [12] (p. 55).
CSR engagement and corporate governance are linked in several dimensions. As reviewed by [12],
corporate governance can be a pillar for CSR, CSR can be a dimension of corporate governance, and
corporate governance and CSR are part of a continuum [27]. For this reason, it is not surprising that
corporate governance codes refer to CSR committees. However, these references are not explicit and
are mainly included as other board committees.
Principle 23 of the Spanish Governance Code of Listed Companies states that “The membership
and organization of any committees established by the board under its powers of self-organization
should be similarly configured to those of mandatory committees” [28], and it is especially related
to the shared concerns between corporate governance and corporate social responsibility. In the
German Corporate Governance Code, there is a recommendation (Recommendation 5.3.) related
to the establishment of committees of members with relevant specialist expertise, although there is
no reference of CSR committees [29]. The French Corporate Governance code of listed corporations
includes no explicit reference to a CSR committee, but includes the areas of social and environmental
responsibility as tasks of the board of directors. The UK Corporate Governance Code in 2018 also
does not include a reference to the creation of a CSR committee and “more and more boards in the
UK seem to be explicitly accepting this role by creating special board committees on CSR” [5] (p. 936).
Although not explicitly referred to as CSR committees, Global Reporting Standards (GRI) standards
recommend disclosing committees responsible for decision-making on economic, environmental, and
social topics in the guideline “Disclosure 102-18”. Different approaches of the relationship between
corporate governance and CSR may have their origin in the corporate governance system. The UK
provides for a one tier board structure as well as Spain, which follows a common law tradition like the
UK. Germany requires a two-tier board, whereas French companies can choose between a two-tier or
one-tier board structure [30]. In one-tier boards, advantages include “superior flow of information,
faster decision-making processes, and better understanding in the business by the boards” [31]. Better
integration of the business strategy and decision making between the management and supervision
can enhance the creation of a CSR committee when CSR is embedded in the business strategy, but
it can also dull some of the effectiveness of the one-tier board. In two-tier boards, the creation of
an independent supervisory board responds to monitor the decisions of the management board on
behalf of other parties [31]. In two-tier systems, committees are less common when compared to
one-tier boards, although large listed companies already have traditional committees such as audit,
remuneration, and nomination committees [32]. In this sense, as the supervisory board members
represent other members and stakeholders, their functions could overlap some possible functions of
the specific CSR committee.
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Although several national corporate governance codes (in both one-tier and two-tier systems)
refer to the creation of a CSR committee, very few countries have gone further when legislating on
CSR committees. In fact, only India has included the convenience of constituting a CSR committee
for certain firms as well as the disclosure of its compositions and tasks in the Companies Act 2013,
which regulates the responsibilities of a company, directors, and dissolution of the company. Although
legislating on CSR issues may clash with the voluntary nature of CSR [33], CSR committees can assist in
the compliance with these normative pressures. However, beyond normative pressures and governance
codes, some institutions have also encouraged the suitability of having a CSR committee. For example,
the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) recommends developing an integrated
CSR decision-making structure. To this end, the guide recommends “identifying people or committees
at the top levels of the firm who will assume key CSR decision making responsibilities.” [34] (p. 58).
The report provides different options for board participation: “a sitting board member could be tasked
with the broad responsibility for overseeing CSR activities; a new member who has specific CSR
expertise could be appointed; CSR responsibilities could be added to the work of existing board
committees; a new CSR board committee could be formed; or the entire board could be involved in
CSR decisions.” [34] (p. 58).
Spanish standard SGE 21, launched by Forética, is “the first European standard that since 2000 has
allowed organizations to implement, audit and certify and ethical and socially responsible management
system.” [35]. This standard complies with trends in international codes of good governance and
transparency and article 6.1.3. includes guidelines on the implementation of a CSR committee [36]. It states
the advisory nature of the committee and its duties (review and interpretation of CSR policies and Codes of
Conduct, the supervision of the degree of compliance with objectives and goals) as well as its composition
and the human, material, and human resources secured to ensure alignment with the strategy and
objectives of the organization. Additionally, the standard refers to practical issues such as the regularity of
committee meetings and communication mechanisms with the highest bodies and stakeholders.
Despite the lack of institutionalization of the implementation of CSR committees, companies
are incorporating them into their management. In the website CSR and the Law, [37] reviewed the
responsibilities of the CSR committees from different firms (e.g., Phillips-Van Heusen Corporation,
McDonald’s, Tiffany & Co, Hasbro, Heinz Company or Bank of New York). Among these responsibilities,
Phillips-Van Heusen and Hasbro included making recommendations regarding proposals of corporate
social responsibility issues, McDonald’s corporation included reviewing trends with significant impacts
of the company; Tiffany & Co included recommending goals and practices of CSR to the Board of
Directors; and BNY Mellon included providing oversight over operations and programs. [5] reviewed
the terms of references of board CSR committees and stated that they tended to focus on reviewing
CSR issues, identifying non-financial risks and monitoring risk management, establishing policies
and standards, monitoring compliance with and performance against the companies CSR policies,
reviewing company reporting on CSR, and overseeing philanthropic activity. Thus, the creation
of a committee responds to “better board effectiveness, by delegating some tasks to fewer decision
makers” [9] (p. 1926) and can be summarized as tasks for prospecting CSR actions, identifying trends,
risk management, and accountability.
The CSR committee is beginning to gain in importance when implementing a CSR policy, as it
“has overall responsibility for formulating, implementing and monitoring the CSR strategy within each
group and its entities” [38]. Previous studies have proven the effect of CSR committees on being at
the highest group of corporate social performance and higher CSR committee effectiveness [9], on the
level of disclosure related to CSR [39–42], and on the level of alignment of sustainability reports with
respect to the GRI guidelines [14]. This leads us to raise our first hypothesis, tested separately for the
four countries and the four considered scores.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Companies with CSR committees are more sustainable than companies without CSR
committees.
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Exploring the effect of the presence of a committee responsible for CSR was raised by [33] with
regard to the profitability of the firms. They found that the profitability of firms with a CSR committee
on their corporate boards did not significantly differ from those without a CSR committee. The
relationship between CSR committees and other types of performance was explored by [8] and [7].
The use of component ratings of corporate social performance by [8] allowed them to confirm that CSR
committees were positively associated with community performance and human rights performance,
and not for the overall corporate social performance (CSP). A similar result was obtained by [7], who
demonstrated that CSR committees influenced the CSP strengths and CSP concerns, but not the CSP
score. These results enhance the idea of using disaggregated indicators to analyze the impact of
CSR committees. Consequently, knowing the different impacts will allow the corporate board to act
accordingly, changing, for example, their composition. Considering this, we hypothesized that the
presence of a CSR or sustainability committee positively affected the four ESG scores, following the
line of [7,25]. The following hypotheses will be also tested for the four countries.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). CSR committees are positively associated with Social Scores.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). CSR committees are positively associated with Environmental Scores.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). CSR committees are positively associated with Corporate Governance Scores.
Hypothesis 5 (H5). CSR committees are positively associated with Economic Scores.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Sample of European Companies
The sample was composed of listed firms from Spain, France, Germany, and the UK for the
period 2005–2015. Regarding World Bank data in 2018 [43], they were among the largest economies in
Europe (Germany, the UK, and France are in the top three in terms of US$ GDP). We selected Spanish
listed companies instead of Italian listed companies for representativeness reasons, as the market
capitalization of Spanish listed companies (in % of GDP) is higher than the market capitalization of
Italian listed companies [44]. In addition, listed companies in Spain represent all corporate structure
systems (one-tier or two tier systems, depending on whether there are one or two separate boards of
directors: supervisory board and management board). Information about CSR committees and certain
pillars of ESG scores is not available for all of the companies in the considered period, so the final
sample was composed by 197 firms (1693 observations) from Spain (33 companies out of 35 listed on
Ibex35, 248 observations in total), France (39 companies out of 40 listed on CAC 40, 353 observations
in total), Germany (29 companies out of 30 listed on DAX 30, 211 observations in total), and the UK
(96 companies out of 100 listed on FTSE100, 881 observations in total). Note that not all companies
provided information for the whole period (observations are also included in the brackets), so we
had an unbalanced data panel. Models were considered independently for each country and the
information was obtained from the Datastream database.
3.2. Model and Variables
We developed two types of analysis to respond to the objective and hypotheses of the study.
First, we obtained the correlation matrix to analyze all pair correlations. There were no high pair-wise
correlations, so did not indicate any collinearity problems. After analyzing the correlation, we divided
the sample of the four considered countries into two groups: companies that had a CSR committee and
companies that did not have a CSR committee. In order to test whether firms with a CSR committee
were more sustainable, we performed a Levene’s test for the equality of variances with the SPSS
software. Second, in order to evaluate whether having a CSR committee had an impact on ESG and
economic scores, we regressed the ESG scores (social scores in Equation (1), environmental scores in
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Equation (2), corporate governance scores in Equation (3), and economic scores in Equation (4)) on a
dummy variable to indicate whether the firm had a CSR committee. To do this, we had an unbalanced
panel of 197 firms (1693 observations) and we used the plm package of the R project for Statistical
Computing [45]. Panel data techniques tend to be the best methodology to analyze companies’ behavior
over time, as it allows for the analysis of the same companies over consecutive years. This technique is
the most recently used in similar studies [8,14]. We included firm (αi) and year (δt) fixed-effects or
random effects for each model, depending on the results of the Hausman test, testing whether the
unique errors were correlated with the regressors [30]. The null hypothesis in the preferred model is
random effects. We also controlled for the following firm-characteristics: independence of the board,
non-executive members, size of the board, chairman CEO-Chairman separation, firm size, profitability,
and indebtedness by following similar models such as those in [7,8,46]. The models were tested in each
of the four considered countries: Spain, Germany, France, and the UK. Table 1 shows the measurements
of the variables.
SSit = β0 + αi + δt + β1CSRCOMit + β2BINDit + β3BNEMit + β4BSIZEit + β5CEOSEPit+
β6SIZEit + β7ROAit + β8DEBTit + εit
(1)
ESit = β0 + αi + δt + β1CSRCOMit + β2BINDit + β3BNEMit + β4BSIZEit + β5CEOSEPit+
β6SIZEit + β7ROAit + β8DEBTit + εit
(2)
CGSit = β0 + αi + δt + β1CSRCOMit + β2BINDit + β3BNEMit + β4BSIZEit + β5CEOSEPit+
β6SIZEit + β7ROAit + β8DEBTit + εit
(3)
EcSit = β0 + αi + δt + β1CSRCOMit + β2BINDit + β3BNEMit + β4BSIZEit + β5CEOSEPit+
β6SIZEit + β7ROAit + β8DEBTit + εit
(4)
Table 1. Measurement of variables. Source: authors.
Variable Measurement
Dependent variable
Regressions equations differ on the dependent variable: 1 Social Score, 2 Environmental Score, 3 Corporate
Governance Score, and 4 Economic Score. All scores were obtained from the Asset4 database.
Independent variable
CSRCOM
Dummy variable (yes = 1/no = 0) responding the question “Does the company have a CSR
committee or team?” (Variable CSR Sustainability Committee)
Control variables
BIND
Percentage of independent board members as reported by the company (variable
Independent Board Members)
BNEM Percentage of non-executive board members (variable Non-Executive Board Members)
BSIZE Total number of board members at the end of fiscal year (variable Board Size)
CEOSEP
Dummy variable (yes = 1/no = 0) responding the question “Does the CEO simultaneously
chair the board?” (variable CEO-Chairman Separation Q1)
SIZE Number of employees
ROA EBIT/Total assets
DEBT Debt to equity ratio
Note: All the variables were obtained from the Asset4 database (Datastream).
3.2.1. Dependent Variables
We wanted to know whether having a CSR Committee influenced the ESG performance. In order to
measure ESG performance, researchers have used information provided by KLD Research & Analytics,
ESG ratings, or Sustainalytics [47]. We used ESG scores provided by the Asset4 database by Thomson
Reuters Datastream. This database provides comprehensive coverage, so these ESG scores are being
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used more and more by diverse authors [24,46,48] and “are designed to transparently and objectively
measure a company’s relative ESG performance” [49]. In order to capture the influencing impact of
CSR committees on ESG scores, we used the next year’s ESG scores following the line of [14].
- Social score (SS). “It measures a company’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty with is workforce,
customers and society, through its use of best management practices” [49].
- Environmental Score (ES). “It measures a company’s impact on living and non-living natural
systems, including the air, land and water, as well as complete ecosystems” [49].
- Corporate Governance Score (CGS). “It measures a company’s systems and processes, which
ensure that its board members and executives act in the best interests of its long term
shareholders” [49].
- Economic Score (EcS). “It measures a company’s capacity to generate sustainable growth and a
high return on investment through the efficient use of all its resources” [49].
3.2.2. Independent Variables
In this study, the independent variable was the existence of a CSR Committee. This is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the company has a CSR committee and 0 otherwise. Figure 1 and Table 2 show
the evolution of listed companies with a CSR committee in the sample of the four considered countries.
Across the whole sample, listed companies evolved from 31% of them having a CSR committee in 2005
to 90% of them having a CSR committee in 2014.
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Table 2. % of listed companies with a CSR committee. Period 2005–2014. Source: Asset4.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Spain 21.43 21.43 31.03 65.52 86.21 86.21 86.21 86.21 86.21 92
Germany 20.51 22.50 47.50 85 97.50 95 97.50 97.50 100 97.22
France 4.35 12.50 28.00 64 88.46 81.48 87.10 90.32 87.10 76.67
UK 44.94 53.93 69.23 82.61 90.22 94.62 94.68 95.83 95.88 90.43
3.2.3. Control Variables
The drivers of ESG performance are diverse, so we used control variables similar to those used in
other studies [50]: board independence, board size, CEO-Chair separation, firm size, return on assets
(ROA), and debt ratio. Independence and size of the board respond to the fact that more diverse and
experienced board members guarantee a sense of alignment with the objectives of other groups of
interest [51] and are “more likely to resolve conflicts by making a balance between a firm’s financial
and non-financial goals” [52] (p. 348). Role duality is controversial, as it can be understood as the
reduction of the effectiveness of the monitoring role of the board or, on the other, hand, increasing
board independency [52,53]. We included firm size, ROA, and debt-to-equity ratio as firm-specific
characteristics following [24,51,54]. Larger companies in size and profitability usually have better CSR
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performance due to the higher availability of resources. On the other hand, more indebted companies
have a lower availability of resources, so they have a lower chance of investing in CSR.
4. Results
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression model. ESG and
economic scores ranged from 0 to 100. The highest average score was the social score in Germany
and Spain, followed by the environmental score, the economic score, and the corporate governance
score. In France, the highest average score was the environmental score, followed by the social
score, the economic score, and the corporate governance scores. In the UK, the highest average score
was the corporate governance score, followed by the social score, the environmental score, and the
economic score.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics. Source: authors.
Variable
Germany France Spain The UK
Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean
Social Score 20.7 98.6 86.2 39.8 98.6 89.3 5.1 98.6 87.8 11.7 98.7 79.3
Environmental
Score 9.6 96.9 85.8 17.0 97.0 89.5 12.1 96.9 82.9 12.5 96.9 76.7
CG Score 4.5 93.3 47.2 14.8 97.4 70.4 4.9 94.6 63.7 17.7 97.6 81.9
Economic Score 8.0 98.7 79.2 1.4 99.1 79.4 11.0 97.9 76.7 2.4 99.1 72.1
CSRCOM 0.0 1.0 0.7 .0 1.0 0.8 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.0 1.0 0.8
BIND 0.0 100.0 15.0 .0 100.0 57.5 0.0 100.0 46.9 0.0 100.0 57.9
BNEM 65.0 100.0 99.7 38.5 100.0 89.3 55.6 100.0 81.4 20.0 100.0 69.5
BSIZE 6.0 23.0 17.0 6.0 24.0 14.3 8.0 24.0 14.2 4.0 21.0 11.1
CEOSEP 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.1
SIZE (th
employees) 2.9 563 124.8 0.9 495.2 117 0.02 319.5 50.9 0.001 537.7 51.2
ROA −10.4 29.0 6.7 −13.1 24.7 6.4 −15.2 51.1 7.0 −38.6 117.4 10.2
DEBT 0.0 32.4 1.8 0.0 4.6 0.9 −15.4 14.1 2.1 −225.8 266.8 1.1
Although the evolution of ESG scores was positive in the four considered scores, we spotted
higher differences in the corporate governance score (Figure 2 and Table 4). Note that the dependent
variable lagged one year, so the period of ESG and economic scores was 2006–2015. German companies
evolved from a score of 40.81 to 53.27, but there was a big difference with the English companies,
whose corporate governance scores have traditionally always been higher.
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Table 4. Evolution of social, environmental, corporate governance, and economic scores by country for
the period 2006–2015. Source: Asset4.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Social Score
Spain 84.95 87.99 90.03 91.21 91.24 89.65 84.12 87.41 87.82 85.1
Germany 79.03 85.19 84.31 87.5 86.43 88.1 87.14 86.52 87.04 91.55
France 84.04 87.07 89.21 91.13 89.68 90.55 89.48 90.15 89.83 91.86
UK 77.39 75.82 77.22 78.34 81.06 79.2 79.78 79.2 80.96 83.26
Environmental
Score
Spain 79 81.13 81.87 85.12 86.82 84.57 79.98 82.87 82.9 84.71
Germany 80.59 83.15 85.83 87.96 87.46 86.62 85.33 85.28 85.11 91.06
France 84.32 86.73 88.61 90.64 90.02 90.48 89.87 90.39 90.93 93.08
UK 72.28 73.81 75.08 77.71 79.18 76.18 77.47 77.29 78.06 79.78




Spain 40.81 41.67 40.32 43.28 48.05 52.72 49.12 50.87 52.21 53.27
Germany 61.39 62.01 62.45 73.27 75.05 76.75 74.18 71.02 73.8 73.94
France 77.72 79.7 77.04 81.61 81.61 84.44 82.77 82.82 85.34 85.04
UK 73.21 74.89 83.63 80.02 76.37 76.86 76.77 74.7 75.23 76.3
Economic Score
Spain 71.33 72.81 74.86 76.39 79.11 84.59 86.11 81.15 81.58 84.76
Germany 69.34 72.87 77.07 79.32 79.88 80.45 84.6 83.14 80.78 86.57
France 64 65.5 61.89 70.72 75.74 76.13 75.55 73.7 76.15 80.39
UK 84.95 87.99 90.03 91.21 91.24 89.65 84.12 87.41 87.82 85.1
Table 5 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables in the model for the four considered
countries. The variable CSR committee (CSRCOM) correlated positively and significantly with all
ESG and economic scores (SS, ES, CGS, and EcS) in the four countries, except for the social scores in
Spain. Board independence only correlated significantly and positively with the corporate governance
score. However, non-executive members, board size, and CEO separation correlated positively and
significantly with the social, environmental, and economic scores, but negatively with the corporate
governance score.
We conducted an independent samples t-test to test whether there was statistical evidence that
the means of two independent groups (those with and without a CSR committee) were significantly
different. We performed this test because our dependent variables (ESG scores) were metric variables
that were normally distributed (Kolmogorov–Smirnov and Shapiro–Wilk p-values lower than 0.05
in all scores). In all cases, with the exception of the corporate governance scores in Germany (where
Levene’s test was not rejected), we considered that equal variances were not assumed. Table 6 shows
the score averages by country in the groups with and without a CSR committee and the t-test for the
equality of means. In the four countries, the average of ESG scores in companies with a CSR committee
was higher than those in companies without a CSR committee. In all cases, there was a significant
difference in the average scores between companies with and without CSR committees.
Results of the regression models are shown in Tables 5–8. Depending on the results of the Hausman
test, we considered the random effects in the social, environmental, and corporate governance score
models in Spain and France (fixed effects in Germany and the UK) and random effects in the economic
score model in Germany (fixed effects in Spain, France, and the UK). We also included the modified
BNF statistic (the generalized Durbin–Watson statistic for panels) for the unbalanced panels, the
Baltagi-Wu’s LBI test, performed with the pbnftest in R. Most of the values were considered normal,
with values around 2 [55].
Regarding social performance, we found that CSR committees significantly and positively affected
social scores in Spain, Germany, France, and the UK, so H2 was confirmed. In Spain, the social scores
were also influenced by the independence (also in the UK) and the size of the board (see Table 7).
However, the relationship with non-executive members was negative. In Germany, higher social scores
were obtained by larger companies.
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Table 5. Correlation matrix.
Spain Germany
Var CSRCOM BIND BNEM BSIZE CEOSEP SIZE ROA DEBT CSRCOM BIND BNEM BSIZE CEOSEP SIZE ROA DEBT
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SIZE 1 −0.345*** 0.063 1
−0.345
*** 0.063
ROA 1 −0.271*** 1
−0.271
***
Note: Spearman’s rho has been considered for dichotomous variables (CSRCOM and CEO_SEP) * Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05
level (2-tailed), *** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Source: Authors.
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Table 6. Average ESG scores in groups without and with a CSR committee and significance of the t-test
for the equality of means. Source: Authors.


















































































Regarding environmental performance, CSR committees significantly and positively affected
environmental scores in Spain, Germany, France, and the UK, so H3 was confirmed (see Table 8).
In Spain, the environmental scores were affected by independence (also in the UK) and size of the
board. As in the social scores, they were also affected by non-executive members, but negatively. More
profitable companies obtained higher environmental scores.
As for corporate governance performance, CSR committees significantly and positively affect
corporate governance scores in Spain, Germany, France, and the UK, so H4 was confirmed (see Table 9).
In Spain, corporate governance scores are affected by the size of the board (also in the UK) and the size
of the company, as in Germany. In this case, the independence of the board was affected in France and
in the UK. The UK is the only country where the separation of the CEO-Chairman negatively affected
the achievement of corporate governance scores.
Results of the regression model on the economic score by country are shown in Table 8. In this
case, CSR committees significantly and positively affected the economic scores in Germany, France, and
the UK, but not in Spain, so H5 was partially confirmed (see Table 10). This is consistent with previous
results in the relationship between CSR committees and economic or financial performance [56].
In Spain, the economic scores were affected by independence and the size of the board and profitability
of the company. Size of the company affected the economic scores positively in Germany and negatively
in France. The UK, again, was the country where the separation of CEO-Chairman negatively affected
the achievement of economic scores.
Sustainability 2019, 11, 5077 13 of 20
Table 7. Results of the regression model by country with the social score as dependent variable.
Source: Authors.
Dependent Variable: Social Score—Spain Dependent Variable: Social Score—Germany
Variable StandardizedCoefficients (β) t Variable
Standardized
Coefficients (β) t
CSRCOM 3.205 2.508 ** CSRCOM 5.590 2.805 ***
BIND 0.135 2.789 *** BIND −0.041 −1.272
BNEM −0.221 −2.475 ** BNEM −0.021 −0.084
BSIZE 0.632 1.933 * BSIZE 0.728 1.482
CEOSEP −0.132 −0.817 CEOSEP 1.042 0355
SIZE 0.000 0.549 SIZE 0.000 1.970 *
ROA −0.004 −0.046 ROA −0.358 −1.51
DEBT −0.012 −0.038 DEBT 0.165 0.403
R2 0.035 R2 0.136
Chi-Square Not significant F statistic 3.4487 ***
Firm-effect Included Firm-effect Included
Year-effect Included Year-effect Included
Hausman Test 11.205 Hausman Test 65.589 ***
Type of panel data Random Type of panel data Fixed
LBI test 1.60 LBI test 2.15
Dependent Variable: Social Score—France Dependent Variable: Social Score—UK
Variable StandardizedCoefficients (β) t Variable
Standardized
Coefficients (β) t
CSRCOM 3.882 4.077 *** CSRCOM 6.001 5.961 ***
BIND 0.006 0.222 BIND 0.065 1.839 *
BNEM −0.040 −0.831 BNEM 0.028 0.525
BSIZE 0.111 0.599 BSIZE −0.113 −0.476
CEOSEP 0.359 0.332 CEOSEP −0.304 −0.206
SIZE 0.000 1.202 SIZE −0.000 −0.005
ROA 0.002 0.245 ROA −0.187 −0.479
DEBT −0.688 −0.798 DEBT −0.000 −0.023
R2 0.108 R2 0.058
Chi-Square 41.835 *** F statistic 5.985 ***
Firm-effect Included Firm-effect Included
Year-effect Included Year-effect Included
Hausman Test 8.5701 Hausman Test 113.44 ***
Type of panel data Random Type of panel data Fixed
LBI test 1.88 LBI test 1.51
Note: * Correlation was significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation was significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed),
*** Correlation was significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).






Variable StandardizedCoefficients (β) t Variable
Standardized
Coefficients (β) t
CSRCOM 7.953 5.117 *** CSRCOM 5.178 2.431 **
BIND 0.105 1.846 * BIND −0.042 −1.238
BNEM −0.382 −3.567 *** BNEM −0.215 −0.786
BSIZE 1.041 2.762 *** BSIZE 0.467 0.889
CEOSEP 1.305 0.675 CEOSEP −2.998 −0.956
SIZE 0.000 1.566 SIZE 0.000 1.760 *
ROA 0.305 2.680 *** ROA −0.377 −1.486
DEBT −0.080 −0.221 DEBT 0.424 0.965
R2 0.160 R2 0.113
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Table 8. Cont.
Chi-Square 40.101 *** F statistic 2.786 ***
Firm-effect Included Firm-effect Included
Year-effect Included Year-effect Included
Hausman Test 8.948 Hausman Test 9914.1 ***
Type of panel data Random Type of panel data Fixed
LBI test 1.67 LBI test 1.62
Dependent Variable: Environmental
Score—France Dependent Variable: Environmental Score—UK
Variable StandardizedCoefficients (β) t Variable
Standardized
Coefficients (β) t
CSRCOM 4.132 5.031 *** CSRCOM 8.647 7.810 ***
BIND −0.060 −2.317 ** BIND 0.074 1.911 *
BNEM −0.041 −0.972 BNEM −0.001 −0.018
BSIZE 0.155 0.913 BSIZE 0.894 3.398
CEOSEP 0.487 0.509 CEOSEP −1.62 −1.002
SIZE 0.000 0.051 SIZE −0.000 −0.234 ***
ROA 0.008 1.113 ROA −0.060 −1.418
DEBT −0.372 −0.473 DEBT 0.006 0.219
R2 0.129 R2 0.102
Chi-Square 50.481 *** F statistic 11.13 ***
Firm-effect Included Firm-effect Included
Year-effect Included Year-effect Included
Hausman Test 12.541 Hausman Test 80.561 ***
Type of panel data Random Type of panel data Fixed
LBI test 1.92 LBI test 1.49
Note: * Correlation was significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation was significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed),
*** Correlation was significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 9. Results of the regression model by country with the corporate governance score as the
dependent variable. Source: Authors.
Dependent Variable: Corporate Governance
Score—Spain
Dependent Variable: Corporate Governance
Score—Germany
Variable StandardizedCoefficients (β) t Variable
Standardized
Coefficients (β) t
CSRCOM 11.792 6.223 *** CSRCOM 8.467 3.090 ***
BIND 0.050 0.719 BIND 0.013 0.302
BNEM −0.24 −1.898 BNEM 0.204 0.580
BSIZE 0.065 0.141 * BSIZE 0.692 1.024
CEOSEP −0.057 −0.024 CEOSEP 1.437 0.356
SIZE 0.000 2.09 ** SIZE 0.000 1.713 *
ROA −0.002 −0.016 ROA −0.137 −0.420
DEBT 0.527 1.084 DEBT −0.018 −0.032
R2 0.161 R2 0.105
Chi-Square 44.405 *** Chi-Square 2.568 **
Firm-effect dw Firm-effect Included
Year-effect Included Year-effect Included
Hausman Test 1.559 Hausman Test 50.516 ***
Type of panel data Random Type of panel data Fixed
LBI test 2.01 LBI test 1.62
Dependent Variable: Corporate Governance
Score—France
Dependent Variable: Corporate Governance
Score—UK
Variable StandardizedCoefficients (β) t Variable
Standardized
Coefficients (β) t
CSRCOM 12.843 8.135 *** CSRCOM 6.811 6.997 ***
BIND 0.103 2.067 ** BIND 0.073 2.140 **
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BNEM 0.0783 0.950 BNEM 0.040 0.778
BSIZE −0.114 −0.353 BSIZE 0.441 1.910 *
CEOSEP −2.163 −1.179 CEOSEP −3.513 −2.464 **
SIZE 0.000 0.952 SIZE 0.000 0.425
ROA 0.014 0.706 ROA −0.019 −0.511
DEBT −0.807 −0.538 DEBT 0.011 0.478
R2 0.188 R2 0.091
Chi-Square 80.054 *** Chi-Square 9.768 ***
Firm-effect Included Firm-effect Included
Year-effect Included Year-effect Included
Hausman Test 12.849 Hausman Test 38.941 ***
Type of panel data Random Type of panel data Fixed
LBI test 1.59 LBI test 1.72
Note: * Correlation was significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation was significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed),
*** Correlation was significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 10. Results of the regression model by country with the economic score as the dependent variable.
Source: Authors.
Dependent Variable: Economic Score—Spain Dependent Variable: Economic Score—Germany
Variable StandardizedCoefficients (β) t Variable
Standardized
Coefficients (β) t
CSRCOM 2.522 1.116 CSRCOM 13.646 4.954 ***
BIND 0.159 1.811 * BIND 0.030 0.687
BNEM −0.578 −3.609 *** BNEM −0.367 −0.955
BSIZE 1.174 1.917 * BSIZE −0.786 −1.732 *
CEOSEP 0.236 0.080 CEOSEP −1.113 −0.306
SIZE −0.000 −0.135 SIZE 0.000 2.334 **
ROA 0.645 3.879 *** ROA 0.115 0.397
DEBT 0.841 1.420 DEBT 0.146 0.264
R2 0.131 R2 0.191
F statistic 3.923 *** F statistic 47.757 ***
Firm-effect Included Firm-effect Included
Year-effect Included Year-effect Included
Hausman Test 96.118 *** Hausman Test 15.434
Type of panel data Fixed Type of panel data Random
LBI test 1.71 LBI test 2.27
Dependent Variable: Economic Score—France Dependent Variable: Economic Score—UK
Variable StandardizedCoefficients (β) t Variable
Standardized
Coefficients (β) t
CSRCOM 9.531 4.362 *** CSRCOM 10.226 5.312 ***
BIND −0.084 −1.161 BIND 0.056 0.833
BNEM −0.155 −1.136 BNEM 0.182 1.762 *
BSIZE 0.781 1.618 BSIZE −0.367 −0.804
CEOSEP −3.905 −1.513 CEOSEP −5.841 −2.072 **
SIZE −0.000 −2.080 ** SIZE 0.000 0.875
ROA 0.401 1.939 * ROA −0.069 −0.925
DEBT −0.636 −0.289 DEBT 0.009 0.197
R2 0.103 R2 0.062
F statistic 4.406 *** F statistic 6.443 ***
Firm-effect Included Firm-effect Included
Year-effect Included Year-effect Included
Hausman Test 23.44 *** Hausman Test 28.085 ***
Type of panel data Fixed Type of panel data Fixed
LBI test 1.81 LBI test 1.57
Note: * Correlation was significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation was significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed),
*** Correlation was significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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5. Discussion
The creation of a CSR committee responds to practical reasons, delegating to experts the
identification, management, and monitoring of sustainable issues. Although the creation of a
CSR committee has not been institutionalized, various national structures such as governance codes or
standards, or supranational structures such as institutions enhancing sustainability have proposed the
convenience of a committee of this type within corporate governance.
This paper aimed to know whether the presence of a CSR committee affects the achievement of
environmental, social, corporate governance (ESG), and economic scores. The mere fact of having a
CSR committee favorably predisposes companies toward social responsibility and signal their concern
for social issues, tending to be more transparent in CSR [9,39,57] and monitor the adherence to adopted
standards [38]. We obtained evidence that companies with CSR committees obtain significantly
higher ESG and economic scores than companies without a CSR committee. This happened in the
four considered countries: Spain, Germany, France, and the UK and for the four considered scores
(excepting corporate governance in Germany), showing the balanced commitment of listed companies
in the sample for all facets of social performance and sustainability. This is in line with [7], who posed
that “these committees have multiple foci and it is most common for a committee to focus on two
stakeholder groups at one” (p. 1181). However, non-significant differences in Germany may be due to
the fact that it was the country with the lowest scores of corporate governance in the sample, which
generated less differentiation among the companies. In addition, it was the only country in our sample
with a mandatory two-tier corporate governance system. Although having a supervisory board may
involve recognizing the vision of other stakeholders beyond shareholders, the fact is that Germany
was the country in our sample with the highest percentage of companies with a CSR committee. This
goes beyond the boundaries of our research objectives in this contribution, but implies the value
companies give to sustainability (beyond corporate governance systems) and it is of sufficient interest
to continue researching the relationship between the creation of expert committees and different
governance systems.
Furthermore, carrying out the analyses with the disaggregation of the scores (environmental,
social, corporate governance, and economic) enhances the line of research participated in by [3,7,8],
showing possible differences in the effect of the presence of a CSR committee. However, the effect in
this case is quite homogeneous. In all countries and scores considered, the presence of a CSR committee
positively affected the achievement of the consequent score (except for the economic score in Spain).
Different components of social performance used in previous studies did not allow us to compare
the results individually. However, those studies were performed in US companies, so we can say
that the effect of CSR committees on non-financial performance can also be observed in European
companies. The exception found in the relationship with the economic score in Spain also contributes
to the heuristic of the CSR committees—financial performance relationship, where contradictory results
have been traditionally raised. The authors in [3] also found a non-significant relationship between
CSR committees and social scores. This led us to think about the importance of studies that consider
CSR committees as mediators [58] in the relationships between corporate governance and corporate
performance. The corporate governance system (one-tier, two-tier) and the way in which the company
is managed and controlled could influence the willingness to address sustainability issues. In addition,
the results related to the variables of control (independent and non-executive members in the board,
size of the board, and CEO-Chairman separation) reflect the lack of a clear pattern in the effectiveness
on non-financial performance. In this case, the type of corporate governance prevailing in each country
could also be one of the explanatory factors. Thus, these results confirm that inquiring into the role
of CSR committees and its interactions with other corporate governance structures is relevant and
timely in a more demanding context in relation to sustainability, if organizations were to represent an
important agent in leading, today, the achievement of sustainable development goals (SDGs).
One of the limitations of this study is precisely the scarce information on the CSR committee,
having only the information regarding its presence or absence. It would have been interesting to have
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considered other characteristics such as its composition, size, objectives, or number of meetings. As a
result, practitioners would know how to create and modulate CSR committees in order to improve
performance effectiveness. In addition, the sample used may seem biased, since listed companies
tend to have greater pressure to legitimize themselves in society. Being large companies, they also
have more resources in their commitment to sustainability. However, the comparison in our study
has been homogeneous and results have to serve as a benchmarking objective and encourage SMEs
to integrate teams or committees responsible for social issues in order to enhance non-financial
performance. To conclude, we should not fall into the error that the mere fact of having a specific
committee devoted to ESG issues (understood as an item of a checklist) is going to boost non-financial
performance. The creation of a new decision-making body implies increasing organizational efforts
and also discrepancies, so the chances of diverting attention from the achievement of CSR objectives
are increased. On the other hand, not having a CSR committee does not imply that companies do
not perform CSR actions, since identifying and monitoring such actions may be the responsibility
of some other member or structure in the organization. However, given the relevance that this
committee has shown in the achievement of non-financial performance in our sample, from here
we call for greater clarity on the part of those corporate governance and regulatory structures that
recommend the existence of a CSR committee in a cursory manner, so that future recommendations and
guidelines should highlight the creation of structures that promote its internalization and significance
in corporate governance.
6. Conclusions
CSR committees emerge to assist corporate boards in social and sustainability issues. Although
the existence of such committees has been mainly related to the quantity and quality of CSR/ESG
disclosure, the effect on corporate social performance (CSP) or non-financial performance has been
focused on US-based samples. This contribution is relevant because we analyzed this relationship in
the listed companies of four European countries, confirming the effectiveness of CSR committees in
several components of non-financial performance, in line with previous studies having disaggregated
CSp. In addition, we have shown that companies with a CSR committee show significantly greater
non-financial performance. Despite having analyzed a sample of large companies in only four European
countries, we must avoid falling into the trap of generalizing that only CSR committees can enhance
non-financial performance. In this sense, a CSR director or a CSR specialist, integrated into some
other group and not a specific CSR committee, could also influence non-financial performance. As a
result of this study, we can extract practical implications for companies. The first of these would be to
recommend the creation of efficient participatory bodies. Increasing the participation and presence
of stakeholders, as indicated by stakeholder theory, shows a clear predisposition of the company to
meet the needs of all stakeholders and greater transparency in its actions. According to the results
obtained, we can say that CSR committees are an example of these efficient participatory bodies, since
they transmit and ensure the social concerns of all stakeholders, and show a greater predisposition to
compliance with social principles and the adoption of global standards. Second, it can be said that
the creation of CSR committees, understood as voluntarily constituted bodies, will show a greater
social predisposition of companies in countries that lack strict CSR governance codes and no specific
references to corporate social responsibility and the audit of social information. Our results can also
serve as a guide for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that want to implement sustainable
policies, knowing that a CSR committee controls, monitors, and promotes sustainable behavior.
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